Greg Detre
17th May 2000
Ryle Room � Philosophy library
consciousness can be in degrees
�there are no fixed facts about consciousness�
independent of the problems/criteria you use for indicating consciousness
although verbal thought = probably/pragmatically the best probe
verificationalist/operationalist standpoint (pg 132) � makes sense in the realm of the subjective
(avoids the bizarre �objectively subjective�)
facts about how things seem
which are radically independent of how they seem to seem = nonsense
does his view need subjective facts?
are there other views that deny them?
facts about how things subjectively are
if so: evidence conflicts, only 1 is right
verification = transcendent
facts about how things seem - inaccesible
opposed
1. whether that stack of chairs over there is green
= implicitly relative to many satisfactory ways of asking the questions
2. could be facts about how things seems to me which are independent of how they seem to seem to me
can we stop Dennett from generalising from microscopic time � scrappy consciousness normally in general
to think that there�s always truth at a moment = bonkers
nonsense to think of experience as momentary
counter-factual escape
if anti-verificationism �/span> countenancing objectively subjective facts
longer time period � 5 mins � coherent, mutually supportive influences to act
indeterminate?
Cartesian theatre � not a homunculus, but instead: �me�
e.g. I have a head � the homunculus is in my head
needs to explain consciousness as a point of view
facts about how things are to/as a person
Christof on Russell
Markov on McDowell
relativity � space discrete/continuous: undetermined difference/differential equations
uncertainty principles